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Abstract
While expectations were high for Bulgaria’s EU membership, it has been marked by numerous domestic 
challenges. This article explores the application of the principle of partnership in Bulgaria in program-
ming EU funds for 2007-2013 as a litmus test for the capacity of the civil society and the preparedness of 
the state’s institutions for full-fledged membership. The article displays evidence that unsuitable adapta-
tion and the remnants of the previous institutional establishment filter the EU leverage in the country. 
Furthermore, the article maps the role of civil society organisations in the process and identifies the 
main challenges and opportunities for their inclusion.1
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Introduction
Despite the undeniably positive effects of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU, various issues surround 
the country’s integration and its ability to take full advantage of all the opportunities. The success-
ful use of EU funds (Bechev, 2010) has been one of the problematic issues. Even though the rate of 
absorption has significantly improved (40.81% by 30 April 20132), the process of planning and program-
ming, the procedures for the inclusion of various stakeholders, the selection of beneficiaries and the 
implementation have been subject to criticism. The over-centralisation and, to a certain degree, the 
monopolisation of the process by the structures of the executive power in Bulgaria inhibited CSOs 
(civil society organisations) from taking an active part in both programming (priority setting) and 
implementation.
The drafting of the National Strategic Reference Framework and the Operational Programmes 
is believed to have only formally included the partners in the process. Data from the Civil Society 
Index for Bulgaria 2008-2010 show that most of the organisations were left out of the process of 
programming the main strategic documents related to the EU funds 2007-2013, which raised questions 
about the ownership of the process, but also about the implications on the sustainable use of the funds 
and their efficiency. Only 6.4% of CSOs reported to have participated in an Operational Programme 
Monitoring Committee; 7% of the CSOs say that they took part in the drafting of the National Strategic 
Reference Framework; 9% for the objectives of the Operational Programmes; around 11.6% for the 
National Development Plan.
1    The paper builds upon emprical data from a project of Open Society Institute-Sofia 2010-2011 through in-depth 
interviews and focus groups ‘Analysis and Assessment of the Application of the Partnership Principle in the pro-
gramming of the EU funds in Bulgaria for the 2007-2013 period’, the Bulgarian Civil Society Index data and on a 
research project of the European Studies Department of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohdidski ‘Bulgarian in the 
EU: the Experience of the First Years’, section 4: ‘The Public Partnership – a Condition for Institutional Efficiency 
and Fight against Corruption’ led by Prof. Georgi Dimitrov.
2    More information can be found at: www.eufunds.bg
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The limited level of inclusion of CSOs in the programming and planning of the EU funds in Bulgaria 
raises several questions in regard to the transparency and validity of the process of programming, 
the capacity and preparedness of the various stakeholders, and the application of the principle of 
partnership  through  including  the  CSOs.  Furthermore,  this  limited  inclusion  outlines  issues  of 
consideration concerning the government-CSO relations and the possibilities for sustainable civil 
dialogue in policy-making in Bulgaria.
There is a growing body of research on the contentious issues surrounding the application of the 
principle of partnership in EU member states (Bauer, 2002; Nanetti, Rato, & Rodrigues, 2004; Milio, 
2007; European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), 2005, 2010). The aim of this article, however, is to provide 
insight into the application of the principle of partnership in Bulgaria as a litmus test for the ability of 
the government and the CSOs in a post-communist member state to partner effectively and cooperate 
in policy-making. The principle of partnership takes this a step further, as it is also part of the EU 
conditionality palette. Therefore, the analysis of this principle in Bulgaria provides an overview of how 
the process of democratisation coupled with costs of domestic transformation unfolds as a response 
to Europeanisation. The article answers the following research questions: 
-  What are the main challenges of domestic transformation and democratisation in Bulgaria in the 
context of the application of the principle of partnership? 
-  What are the mechanisms for CSO-government relations and have they provided a functional 
background for the successful application of the principle of partnership in order to ensure a 
smooth process of programming and implementation of the EU funds? 
-  What are the implications for the ownership of the priorities of the EU funds by the various 
stakeholders?
-  What  are  the  implications  for  the  development  of  civil  society  and  the  functionality  of  civil 
dialogue?
-  What are the lessons learnt for the upcoming programming period of 2014-2020? 
In order to ensure the validity of the findings and conclusions, the article employs the following: 
secondary data on the state of civil society development in Bulgaria, involvement in the EU funds and 
CSOs-government relations, analysis of legislative and strategic documents related to the programming 
of EU funds in Bulgaria, minutes of working meetings, focus groups on regional level (process of 
planning on NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) and semi-structured interviews with 
participants in the process of programming for the 2007-2013 period. The research was conducted as 
part of a policy project of the Open Society Institute – Sofia. This project builds on the team members’ 
experience as part of the programming process and further identifies the main stages, procedures and 
stakeholders in the programming phase of the EU funds in Bulgaria for the 2007-2013 period. Based on 
the available lists of participants who were involved in the programming of the National Development 
Plan and the Operational programmes in 2006 (including 77 ministries, agencies and administrative 
bodies  and  structures,  and  16  economic  and  social  partners  and  CSOs3),  the  National  Strategic 
3    The distinction between the economic and social partners and CSOs is deliberately singled out. As further 
outlined in the article, the economic and social partners had easier and more secured access to the process of 
programming and later on in the Monitoring Committees. They are also a part of the institutionalised Economic 
and Social Council, founded in 2001, which includes representatives of all employers’ organisations, all trade 
unions, business associations, and other national represented organisations. The authenticity of this form of 
civil dialogue is somewhat compromised. Most of the organisations are considered quasi-civic and their repre-
sentativeness is also questioned. On the other hand, the CSOs had another trajectory of inclusion and participa-
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Reference Framework4 and the FORUM meetings5, the main actors were identified under the groups 
of the political representatives in the government at that time, the expert level in the administration 
and the main economic and social partners and CSOs. Given the fact that the research was conducted 
4 years after the programming phase, a lot of the administrative staff was difficult to find and contact. 
The main political figures, institutions, economic and social partners and CSOs were identified and 
letters and emails were sent to 33 contacts on a political and expert level of the administration, 
as well as to 20 economic and social partners and CSOs. Out of this, 14 interviews (some of the 
interviews were with more than one respondent) were conducted with 3 political representatives, 
6 representatives at an expert level from the administration, and 7 CSOs. After repeated attempts to 
arrange interviews with the economic and social partners, two representatives responded, but in the 
end declined to be interviewed. In addition, the experts involved in the project who have taken part 
in the process of programming shared their experience during working meetings. The previous were 
utilised to identify the main stages, the respective procedures and the mechanisms for including the 
various stakeholders in the process of programming the national strategic documents for the 2007-
2013 period. The interview sample was structured to encompass the experience of the respondent; 
the view on the process and its main stages, legal documents, procedures and stakeholders; the 
importance of programming as a stage of priority-setting; assessing the principle of partnership and 
the available mechanisms for the involvement of CSOs; recommendations and a view on the necessary 
capacity and preparation for successful programming. 
The article is structured as follows: the first part will outline a short review on the theory of 
Europeanisation and its interaction with institutional change in a post-communist setting. The second 
part focuses on the historical evolution of the principle of partnership as part of the EU regional policy, 
as well as of its implications for better governance. The third part analyses the empirical data on the 
application of the principle of partnership in programming the EU funds in Bulgaria for the period of 
2007-2013. The article will also identify the factors that filter EU leverage in this field and will discuss 
the potential of the principle of partnership as an agent of transformation in Bulgaria. 
Europeanisation and domestic compliance
In  this  article,  Europeanisation  is  understood  as  the  process  of  “construction,  diffusion, 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing 
things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU 
decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies” (Radaelli, 2000; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p.30). This wide definition provides a 
framework for exploring the domestic dynamics during the process of accession and EU integration. 
It emphasises the two dimensions of the process – the EU supranational governance and the national 
policy-making and, thus, accommodates the process of adaptation of the actors, processes, norms 
and policy-making on a national level. 
4    The list of participants annexed to the National Strategic Reference Framework mentions the main ministries 
and adminsitrative bodies, together with the main economic and social partners and CSOs, however, without 
providing specific contact details.
5    The FORUM approach was used as a way to gather all the relevant stakeholders to discuss the National Strate-
gic Reference Framework and the Operational Programmes. It was supported by the Swiss Agency for Develop-
ment and Co-operation (SDC), aiming to assist the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting (AEAF) for 
the organisation of Consensus Fora on Operational Programmes (OP) Priorities for the National Development 
Plan elaboration process. Although the format is considered efficient, the participants pointed to its limitation 
in scope and time as there were 5 sessions altogether (one per each OP) and there was not enough time and 
resources to effectively discuss the issues, and lots of the stakeholders felt they were not informed well in ad-
vance and did not participate on an equal footing. Furthermore, the proposals and recommendations that were 
discussed at the Forum and sent to the Ministry of Finance did not receive any feedback or follow-up.Programming EU funds in Bulgaria: Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of Civil Society 25
Europeanisation depends on the level of convergence and convenience between the processes, 
policies, and institutions on the European level, on the one hand, and the processes, policies, and 
institutions on the domestic level, on the other (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; Bache, George 
& Bulmer, 2011). National institutions are required to change their policies and even institutional 
structures in response to Europeanisation. Sociological institutionalism would expect that the more 
institutional structures at the European and domestic levels look alike (structural isomorphism), the 
less adaptational pressure member states should face (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Europeanisation, 
however, can cause institutional misfit, challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective 
understandings attached to them (Börzel & Risse, 2003). In spite of the Europeanisation process 
playing a key role in the transformation of the domestic systems of governance, domestic institutions 
and particular features of the pre-existing national and local institutional infrastructure are subject to 
adaptation. The significance of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure has been also demonstrated 
by the social, economic and political transitions of the post-communist states (Offe, 1996; European 
Commission, 2003).
Börzel and Risse (2003, p.69) distinguish three degrees of domestic change: 
(1)  Absorption: Member states incorporate EU policies into their programmes and domestic structure 
but without modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions, thus, the degree of domestic 
change is low.
(2)  Accommodation: Member states accommodate Europeanisation pressures by adapting existing 
processes, policies, and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying 
collective understanding of them. The degree of domestic change is modest and a way of doing 
this is by ‘patching up’ existing policies and institutions with new ones.
(3)  Transformation: Member states need to replace existing policies, processes, and institutions with 
new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features 
and/or the underlying collective understanding are fundamentally changed. Thus, the degree of 
domestic change is high.
EU integration through transformation aims at a coherent, qualitatively new change of the state 
of policy-making. It creates serious pressure on the domestic actors, processes and procedures. In 
order to explain the point of departure for the degree of change in Bulgaria, the contextual factors and 
legacies need to be taken into account. 
The extent of the regime transformation after 1989 in Bulgaria presupposes a dramatic overhaul 
of the existing institutions and agents, mindset, rules of procedure and governance that represent 
the pillars of democracy consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.10). The Central and Eastern post-
communist candidate states had to confront higher challenges of transposition compared to previous 
enlargements. The formulation of the conditions was ambivalent in certain domains, ‘thin’, lacking 
precise regulation (like in regional policy (Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2004)) and subject to interpretation 
and interference from different actors on the national level. These actors shaped the domestic scene 
and filtered the process of Europeanisation. 
Several factors define the contextual background in Bulgaria, which are determinant for mediating 
the process of domestic change and finding the precise degree of ‘fit’:
-  Hierarchical type of communication and administrative culture.
-  The inherited over-centralisation creates complex hybrid structures with fragmented functions. 
There is no coherent strategy of institutional change, thus, leaving it subject to patchwork and to 
a top-down process. The main management structures and decision making is concentrated in the 
executive branch and is dependent on the personalities, rather than on uniform rules. 
-  Lack of civil society actors and sustainable civil society-government dialogue that leaves the policy 
process dependent on the ‘good will’ of the administration (Bulgarian Center for Non-profit Law 
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-  Weak administrative and institutional capacity, corruption, problems with respecting the rule of 
law and questions surrounding judicial independence (Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
Commission Reports on Bulgaria and Romania6; Transparency International 2008-2012; Center for 
the Study of Democracy, 2009, 2010).
-  The persistent trajectory of institutional change: issues of tensions between informal constraints 
and formal rules, and their implications on domestic transformation: adoption of EU rules and 
new modes of governance that build upon the remnants of a communist institutional culture of 
over-centralisation (North, 1990; Kabakchieva, 2004, 2007; Dimitrov, 2004, 2008; Dimitrov, Danchev 
& Karamfilova, 2008).
-  Specific resistance in the institutional character of the post-communist setting as a principle of 
the state structure and mechanism of function. This shapes a specific manner of institutional 
behaviour  that  entails:  ‘encapsulation  of  the  institutional  structures’;  ‘feudalisation  of  the 
directorates’; ‘a lack of horizontal linkages and communication’; ‘a lack of taking responsibility’; 
‘problems  with  professionalism’;  ‘a  lack  of  institutional  memory  and  continuity’;  ‘a  lack  of 
predictability’ (Dimitrov, 2004; Dimitrov, Danchev & Karamfilova, 2008). 
The degree of change, however, is conditioned by the path dependencies of the political culture and 
practices (Stark & Bruszt, 1998). However, the misfit is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement if 
one is expected to see domestic change in response to the adaptation pressures from the EU (Borzel 
& Risse, 2003). Institutional change is determined by the final outcome of this interaction, which 
characterises  the  development  and  functioning  of  institutions  (North,  1990;  Kabakchieva,  2007; 
Dimitrov, 2008, Dimitrov, Danchev & Karamfilova, 2008). From the short overview of the domestic 
factors, it is evident that the degree of change that Bulgaria experiences in its integration to the EU 
also includes a significant institutional misfit that requires changes in policies and procedures, as 
well as replacing old rules and institutions or designing completely new ones. If we apply the new 
institutionalist typology, the transformation is conditioned by the interaction between the formal 
rules (the EU requirements, policy, procedures) and the informal constraints on the domestic level in 
Bulgaria, see Table 1.
 The interactions between the formal rules and the informal constraints have serious implications 
for the country’s accession and integration into the EU. The successful transformation depends on 
the ability of Bulgaria and its institutions to transform and reconcile this misfit and make the formal 
requirements operative. This has proven particularly challenging in the implementation of the EU 
funds. The complex nature of the process of preparation has put serious adaptational pressure on 
the institutional structures, mechanisms and decision-making procedures in the country. Although 
the pre-accession programming of PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD was expected to assist the candidate 
states  in  the  process  of  transformation,  in  the  case  of  Bulgaria,  this  proved  to  be  problematic 
(Kabakchieva, 2007; Nikolova, 2007; Hristova, 2010). Instead of transformation, the institutions and 
the respective procedures were mimicking change and predominantly applying the requirements 
only formally. Recent reports have raised questions about the rent-seeking opportunities, the misuse 
and misappropriation of funds and ‘the illusion of inclusion’ of various stakeholders, coupled with 
the concentration of power in the executive branch (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2009, 2010; 
Harvey, 2004; Hristova-Kurzydlowski, 2011). The background situation in Bulgaria seems to display 
similar evidence to Greece’s mediating actors (Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2004). Instead of decentralising, 
the over-centralised post-communist state strengthened its role and dominant position through the 
Ministry of Finance, leaving limited roles for other actors (Yanakiev, 2010) and making the executive 
government the main winner of the structural funds changes.
6    Reports from 2008-2012 can be found from: http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htmProgramming EU funds in Bulgaria: Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of Civil Society 27
In order to assess how the application of the principle of partnership happened in Bulgaria and 
what challenges it confronted, the next section will explore the foundation and the concepts behind 
the development and evolution of this principle. Moreover, it will analyse the potential factors that 
facilitate or inhibit its application as a starting point in exploring how the process took place in 
Bulgaria.
The principle of partnership. The application of the principle of partnership in 
Bulgaria
Evolution of the principle of partnership
The  principle  of  partnership  has  been  in  existence  for  almost  24  years  and  has  generated  a 
significant body of academic discussions on its function, its impact and added value. The principle of 
partnership has been seen as the anchor of multi-level governance (Bruszt, 2008). ‘Partnership’ can 
be understood as a policy-making device that allows public authorities and societal actors to trade 
access, information and commitment, based on a ‘multilevel administrative core’ that stresses local 
‘executive’ involvement and that, in particular, requires the participation of the Commission in all 
policy stages and its presence at all policy-relevant layers of government during implementation. 
Furthermore, recently ‘partnership’ has been viewed as a structural principle for policy-making in the 
EU (Bauer 2002, p.773). 
Article 4 of the 1988 Framework Regulation, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052 (Council of the 
European Communities, 1988) defined ‘partnership’ as follows: “Community operations shall be such as 
to complement or contribute to corresponding national operations. They shall be established through 
close  consultations  between  the  Commission,  the  Member  State  concerned  and  the  competent 
authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting 
as a partner in pursuit of a common goal. These consultations are hereinafter referred to as the 
´partnership’. The partnership shall cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of 
operations.”
With  the  regional  policy  reforms  of  1993  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2081  (Council  of  the 
European Communities, 1993), the definition was developed further to include: “including, within 
the framework of each Member State’s national rules and current practices, the economic and social 
partner, designated by the Member State at national, regional, local or other level /.../”. Gradually, 
partnership takes the form of a wider consultation of all the relevant bodies, as seen in Article 8 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260, which states that in designating the most representative partnership 
at the national, regional, local or any other level, the Member State shall create a wide and effective 
Table 1: Informal constraints and formal rules, Bulgaria
INFORMAL CONSTRAINTS (BULGARIA) FORMAL RULES (EU)
-  Post-communist administrative culture
-  Over-centralisation of policy and decision making
-  Lack of horizontal linkages in the administration 
and personalised bureaucracy
-  Lack of predictability of the policy process
-  Formalistic approach to CSO-government 
partnership
-  Administrative and institutional capacity
-  Decentralisation of decision making and 
deconcentration of power
-  Impersonalised bureaucracy subject to rules
-  Predictable policy-making process
-  Good governance and participation
-  Inclusion of stakeholders
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association of all the relevant bodies, according to national rules and practice, taking account of 
the need to promote equality between men and women and sustainable development through the 
integration of environmental protection and improvement requirements. (Council of the European 
Communities, 1999)
Along the vertical axis of the principle, all partnerships should include representatives of the 
European  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  All  other  competent  authorities  and  bodies  are 
included along the horizontal axis. The Member State authorities are able to determine how the 
relevant stakeholders are to be involved in the process according to their internal mechanisms for 
decision and policy making.
Based on the European Commission guidelines, the partnership principle (Ministry of Finance of 
Republic of Bulgaria, 2004) is considered to target:
(1)  Better planning, development of an overall action and implementation strategy.
(2)  Better implementation with the objective of ensuring coordinated action.
(3)  Increasing  the  capacity  for  regional  and  local  development;  better  targeting  of  programme 
objectives and considering the needs at all levels.
Following further demands for the inclusion of a wider circle of stakeholders, the last amendments 
concerning the partnership principle in Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (Council of 
the European Communities, 2006) further specify: 
“/.../Each Member State shall organise, where appropriate and in accordance with current national 
rules and practices, a partnership with authorities and bodies such as:
(a)  the competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities;
(b) the economic and social partners;
(c)  any other appropriate body representing civil society, environmental partners, non-govern  mental 
organisations, and bodies responsible for promoting equality between men and women.
Each Member State shall designate the most representative partners at national, regional and 
local  level  and  in  the  economic,  social,  environmental  or  other  spheres  (hereinafter  referred 
to as partners), in accordance with national rules and practices, taking account of the need to 
promote equality between men and women and sustainable development through the integration 
of environmental protection and improvement requirements./.../
The  partnership  shall  cover  the  preparation,  implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation  of 
operational programmes. Member States shall involve, where appropriate, each of the relevant 
partners, and particularly the regions, in the different stages of programming within the time limit 
set for each stage.”
The  main  rationale  for  the  inclusion  of  actors  in  addition  to  the  Commission  and  central 
governments was to increase the effectiveness of the funds implementation: it was expected that this 
wider involvement would help generate projects eligible for funding, feed back local expertise into 
the process for planning purposes and build local development capacities (Batory & Cartwright, 2011). 
The principle of partnership has developed in order to provide for more legitimacy and better co-
ordination, while improving transparency. Furthermore, its application contributes to a better level 
of absorption and higher ownership among beneficiaries, to sustainability and long-term change, as 
well as to legitimacy and empowerment of stakeholders (Kelleher, Batterbury & Stern, 1999; ECAS, 
2005; 2010). 
The evolution in the development of the principle of partnership mirrors the development in the 
EU and the deepening of integration through the widening of the single market. More competence 
was  delegated  to  the  supranational  level  of  governance,  which  has  brought  demands  for  more 
transparency and inclusion. The principle of partnership is viewed as the foundation of the EU efforts 
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principles (European Commission, 2001; European Social Fund Committee, 2007). In its guidelines for 
the cohesion policy of 2007-2013, the Commission shows itself to be a strong advocate for partnership 
that “applies not only to the economic agenda but also to the broader effort to involve citizens who, 
through the partnership and multilevel governance arrangements under which cohesion policy is 
managed, can become directly involved in the Union’s growth and jobs strategy” (ECAS, 2010, p.6). 
Although the principle of partnership has been viewed as the main component of the structural 
funds and has gained a lot of credit for involving broader participation at all stages of EU funds, it has 
also been the object of growing criticism. Potential obstacles to its application have been outlined 
regarding the co-ordination and inclusion of partners, the lack of capacity and the potential resistance 
to its implementation (ECAS, 2010). In Germany, the principle has been defined as ‘irksome duty’, 
pointing to potential conflicts and irritation in the central government, which sometimes perceives the 
principle of partnership as an attempt by the Commission to by-pass the national level of governance 
(Bauer, 2002). In Portugal, the application has been resisted to some extent by the refusal to create 
regional authorities, which also points to the low level of capacity among non-state actors (Nanetti 
et al., 2004). In Greece, the application has been conditioned by the national context of political 
centralisation, weak civil society and clientilistic paternalistic networks (Getinis & Grigoriadou, 2004). 
In the EU-10 (new post-communist member states), the introduction of partnership was difficult due 
to the lack of resources and experience (Latvia) and often remained at a rather formal level (Lithuania 
and Slovakia) (ECAS, 2010). The extent of partnership in terms of vertical or horizontal relationships 
differed considerably across the 25 states in the 2000-2006 period. 
The 1999 evaluation has shown evidence that there are significant differences in the participation of 
partners at different stages of the programming cycle and also significant variance of the arrangement 
across  member  states  (Keheller  et  al.,  1999).  Although  the  partnership  is  seen  to  contribute  to 
transparency and effectiveness of the process, there are various examples that exhibit limitations to 
the principle of partnership in terms of its governance and administrative function, but also in the 
inclusiveness of actors, CSOs in particular, and decentralisation and deconcentration of power.
The Commission agenda on introducing and sustaining the principle of partnership, therefore, is 
conditioned by various mediating factors (Marinov & Malhasian, 2006, p. 134; 138-143; Kelleher et al., 
1999). Some of the factors build on the existing contextual background, while others deal with the 
preconditions of existing sustainable relations between the CSOs and the governments.
(1)  External factors, related to the environment 
a.  Funding programmes requiring and encouraging partnership
b.  Legislation requiring partnership
c.  Framework of CSO-government relations
d.  National policy encouraging partnership 
e.  Clear and transparent criteria, procedures and requirements for selection of partners
f.  Decentralisation and local self-government
g.  Regionalisation, decentalisation and deconcentration of public administration
h.  Opportunities and traditions of influencing and participating in decision and policy making
i.  Relevant  and  publicly  available  information  for  the  various  stakeholders  to  ensure  equal 
participation 
j.  Feedback and reporting mechanisms 
k.  The involvement of the European Commission as animators and regulators
(2) Internal factors, related to the partnership and partners 
a.  Long-term nature of partnership and sustainable partnership structures
b.  Prior experience of partnership in working with EU and national programmes
c.  Technical, financial and institutional capacity of partnership and partners
d.  Organisational maturity
e.  Clear roles, organisation and rules of coordination 30 Desislava Hristova Kurzydlowski
f.  Understanding of the role of partnership
g.  Mutual trust and readiness to cooperate
h.  Accommodation with national institutional, administrative and cultural traditions
i.  Level of development of civil society and CSOs. 
A number of issues common to member states were further observed (Bache, 2000), such as the 
importance of prior partnership experience, the national institutional traditions, the existing models 
of governance and the role of partnership. Other studies point to the importance of the participation 
of the CSOs (CEE Bankwatch, 2005; SF Team for Sustainable Future, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) and claim that 
the CSOs can contribute to the efficient and transparent use of EU funds, together with the other 
stakeholders in committees for programming, implementation and monitoring of the funds and in 
environmental assessments of the funded programmes and projects.
Given the background related to the principle of partnership and the factors that determine the 
efficiency of its application, in the next section this article will go on to empirically explore the state 
of affairs in Bulgaria. 
The application of the principle of partnership in Bulgaria: Challenges and opportunities
Bulgaria does not have a long tradition in the field of strategic planning and programming as specified 
in the EU policy making, which demands specific institutional and administrative capacity to perform 
on a national and municipal level, as well as the involvement of CSOs (Marinov, Garnizov & Georgiev, 
2006). Preliminary attempts in this regard can be observed in programming the pre-accession funds 
of PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD, and the first attempts at programming in 2002, when developing the 
National Development Plan (which has never been officially adopted), however, with limited success. 
Such an approach to governance appears as a concept mainly due to programmes and projects funded 
by foreign donors. 
The idea of domestic adaptation to European rules and approaches to strategic planning as well 
as new institutional models is oriented towards bureaucratisation – impersonal decision making 
based on formal and transparent rules, beyond the arbitrary will of a certain official or empowered 
person.  Thus,  the  European  system  is  oriented  towards  effectiveness  –  the  funds  are  allocated 
for certain activities, not to certain people (Kabakchieva, 2007). The long tradition of communist 
planning (Dimitrov, 2004) substantially differs from the process of planning and programming within 
the EU. The communist planning depends on the discretion of the leading party, which is focused 
on extensive development. In this type of planning, there is a succinct lack of a management cycle 
and efficiency indicators, there is no hierarchical sequence of decision-making with directives from 
the party state, and no horizontal linkages and delegated responsibilities. These together with the 
identified institutional deficiencies of the post-communist state above raise the issue of the capacity 
and efficiency of the process. Therefore, the application of partnership is a by-product of this path-
dependent process and has implications on the preparation for participation in the Structural Funds 
and EU regional policy (Marinov & Malhasian, 2006).
Design, organisation and framework
The application of the partnership principle was regulated by the Regional Development Act of 1999 
and was amended by the act of 2004. At the same time, special institutional structures, the district 
and regional development councils (though they are appointed by the Council of Ministers and with 
limited deconcentration functions) were established. At the initial stages of Bulgaria’s preparation 
to participate in the EU cohesion policy and to absorb EU funds (1998-1999), the application of the 
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Plan under SAPARD (1999-2000) is a case in point. At the later stages of the preparation for accession 
and participation in the EU cohesion policy, the partnership principle was incorporated in all relevant 
policy, legislative and guidance documents.
The main national legislation that defines the main structures, the distribution of responsibilities 
and the coordination functions is outlined in the Council of Ministers Ordinances 171, 173, 174/2002 
(Open Society Institute – Sofia, 2011). The stipulations of these acts regulate the preparation of the 
National Development plan, specify the groups of partners and how they can participate. Most of 
these acts actually secured the central role of the national government. Within the text of Ordinance 
171/20027 regulating the formation of the various monitoring bodies, it is easy to see that state 
control was all but inevitable, since most members of the monitoring bodies represented the central 
government, which left little room for the inclusion of non-state actors (Nikolova, 2007; Yanakiev, 
2010) and allowed for further centralisation of governance.
It deemed fatal that we allowed re-enforcing the sectoral approach in planning and in governance, 
which is already quite strong due to the centralised system in the state. But we further enhanced 
it  with  EU  money.  Each  ministry  became  three  times  stronger,  because  of  the  EU  money  it 
manages/.../To me, it is highly unclear who decided that such a great share of the EU funds should 
be allocated to the state institutions themselves as direct beneficiaries. (Respondent not willing 
to be referenced on this)
The  creation  and  elaboration  of  the  fund  management  system  for  the  2007-2013  financial 
framework, as well as the overall programming process at national level and the application of the 
partnership principle in this process, were laid down in the Strategy for Bulgaria’s Participation in 
the European Union Structural and Cohesion Funds. In this regard, a Coordination Council for the 
National Development Plan was established, and the overall responsibility for the coordination was 
given to a directorate at the Ministry of Finance, which was designated Managing Authority for the 
resources provided by EU Structural Funds and the implementation of the National Strategic Reference 
Framework. The various activities on the preparation and consultation of the National Development 
Plan 2007-2013 were assigned to the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting (AEAF). 
The  requirements  for  the  application  of  the  partnership  principle  were  incorporated  in  the 
methodological  guidelines  concerning  the  National  Development  Plan  and  the  Operational 
Programmes,  the  working  groups  for  each  Operational  Programme  and  the  National  Strategic 
Reference Framework. Since 2005, a number of public forums have been held to form a consensus 
on the National Development Plan and the drafts of the National Strategic Reference Framework 
2007-2013(Council of Ministers of Republic of Bulgaria, 2006). The texts of the Operational Programmes 
were also said to be drafted in application of the partnership principle. However, the principle of 
partnership is mostly stated rather than implemented in practice. Issues of formalism and lack of co-
ordination and capacity determined the process.
The process was not very transparent or open to the citizens /…/ The Forum meetings did not 
manage to provoke public interest, and it is not clear what happened with the recommendations 
and proposals we made. There was no feedback or follow-up. (Balkan Assist)
During  the  previous  programming,  there  was  feudalisation  in  the  respective  ministries,  each 
considering their Operational Programme as the most important one and needing most of the EU 
money. I am not certain if this is the approach to advance the country. (Former Deputy Minister)
The evidence from the empirical research exhibits problematic coordination, a lack of expertise and 
7    Council of Ministers of Republic of Bulgaria, Ordinances data base in Bulgarian: http://pris.government.bg/prin/
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a chaotic process of programming. There was no universal approach to strategic planning or document 
from which to stipulate the obligations and responsibilities and provide a general framework. Each 
working group in the respective ministry was developing a patch of strategic documents, whilst the 
coordination was largely formal. The decision making was seriously centralised, whereas the sub-
national bodies claim that the municipal, district and regional development plans are mainly on paper 
without any substance.
Especially after 1990, we (in the ministries) do not know how to draft a strategic document/…/
There  are  no  clear-cut  and  uniform  guidelines  /…/A  document  is  being  drafted  without  any 
harmonisation with other acts, as there are no such practices/…/We do not have the idea of 
strategic planning. /…/There is a lack of a uniform approach to policy making. There should be a 
law for strategic planning with overall uniform rules – period of programming, description of the 
process, framework of coordination. Otherwise, each ministry has its own pace of policy making 
and programming its agenda. There are numerous strategies and programmes in each ministry, 
but no co-ordinated policies in one sector. (Council of Ministers, Coordination of the National 
Programme for Reform 2020, former Coordination Council, Bulgaria)
It came to a point where there were more than 85 different strategies (by 2005, comment by 
the  author),  from  which  we  tried  to  summarise  the  substance  for  the  National  Strategic 
Reference Framework and there was no substance. There were priorities without deadlines and 
programmes or any resources for implementation. (Agency for regional analysis and forecasts, 
now environmental NGO)
The lack of experience and capacity also resulted in ambiguity about the purpose and scope of 
programming documents. The National Development Plan was prepared in parallel to a National 
Strategic Reference Framework, thus, disrupting the programming logic, e.g. the initial widespread 
expectations that the National Strategic Reference Framework would be formulated on the basis 
of the operational programs. Furthermore, until the autumn of 2005 there was a lack of indicative 
distribution of financial resources among the programmes. (Marinov & Malhasian, 2006; Open Society 
Institute – Sofia, 2011)
[There was a] lack of experience and preliminary preparation /…/ [We were] unprepared – the state 
administration, which has the leading role and responsibility in the process (of programming), 
as well as the organisations themselves to participate effectively and qualitatively in the process. 
(Local and regional development NGO, Sofia)
We worked a lot with the organisations; it was obligatory for them to be included. The contribution 
was not quite substantial, not one of these organisations had the capacity, but in some aspects it 
was useful. /…/ It is essential how much you open the door, because there are organisations that 
only want to take part, but do not have the relevant capacity or expertise. Such organisations were 
not allowed, but most of the known ones were part of the debate. (Former Deputy Minister)
The problem was first in the preparation of the participants, and second, in the ability to listen 
each other. In my opinion, the discussions at all the stages of the process to a larger extent were 
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Actors and inclusion: procedure, criteria, practice
The guidelines for partnership identified the following partners to be included in the process of 
programming:
(1)  Government (administrative) partners:
a.  Government institutions, ministries, and agencies
b.  Regional and local authorities, representative of municipalities
(2) Social and economic partners
a.  Social and economic partners representative for the country (i.e. trade unions, employer and 
industrial organisations).
b.  Non-governmental organisations representing important interest groups: equal opportunities; 
civil society; environmental protection; international movements; technology and innovation 
centres; professional associations and organisations, etc.
c.  Research and education groups: rector’s councils; the Academy of Sciences; leading universities; 
vocational  training  organisations;  secondary  education  organisations;  leading  research 
institutions or their associations, etc.
d.  Business: business associations and affiliates, leading companies operating in the country.
The criteria and mechanisms for partner identification and inclusion are laid down in a special 
partnership manual8 (Ministry of Finance of Republic of Bulgaria, 2004). The group of government 
authorities and regional and municipal representatives, as well as industrial organisations and trade 
unions, were easily identified because of their high profile and their participation in other forms 
pursuant to the Labour Code, the National Tripartite Council, etc. The other participants in the 
process were identified using certain criteria approved by the National Development Plan working 
group according to: representativeness; scope of interests; balanced distribution of interest groups; 
equal opportunities; civil society; environmental protection; international movements; professional 
associations and organisations; technology and innovation centres; balanced representation of social 
and economic partners. The group of CSOs falls within this category, i.e. the subject of an unspecified 
and overgeneralised selection approach. Due to their high profile, the first groups were automatically 
included in the consultation and programming process, whereas the rest were subject to selection 
criteria, which were not sufficiently detailed against the backdrop of no uniform mechanism for 
coordinating the interactions.
I was always cautious to send an email only to certain NGOs. Information days were organised, 
[there were] notices in the media, open invitations. Otherwise it is not possible to reach them. The 
whole communication was through the website and the information days (public campaign for 
the funds). (Former Deputy Minister)
The actual selection of participating CSOs was left to the National Development Plan working group. 
This working group was responsible for monitoring and coordinating the drafting of the Operational 
Programmes  and  included  representatives  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (EU  Funds  Management 
Directorate), the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting (AEAF), the relevant ministries and 
social and economic partners mandated by organisations, a total of 25. The Operational Programmes 
working groups were entrusted with the development of the relevant programme objectives and 
priorities. Their membership was similar, 25 people representing the leading ministries, the AEAF, 
the EU Funds Management Directorate and the social and economic partners. The relevant working 
groups were established by order of the respective Minister, who was also responsible for appointing 
the social partners. 
8    The Socio-Economic Partnership in Bulgaria Methodological Guidance to the National Development Plan: http://
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With  the  perspective  for  membership  come  demands  on  a  country’s  institutions  and  their 
modus operandi, as well as on a country’s civil society and its associational forms (Nanetti et al., 
2004). The integration process also makes it necessary for civil society to be engaged through new 
forms of participation that allow diverse organised groups to interact in both a formal and informal 
manner with policy making structures and, thus, become important actors in the formulation and 
implementation of policies. This precondition proves essential for the application of the principle of 
partnership.
However, the application of the partnership principle turns out to be more effective between the 
various central authorities, unlike in situations where local authorities, regional stakeholders or social 
and economic partners and CSOs participate. In its greater part, CSO participation was a result of 
their own activity, through forming coalitions and organising representation. The mechanisms for the 
appointment of CSO representatives were not clearly laid down despite the available criteria, and this 
creates the impression of a lack of transparency and of parity between the stakeholders. The lack of 
a transparent and uniform mechanism raises the question about certain arbitrariness in determining 
the manner of CSO participation and the insufficient development of the partnership mechanism.
As it stands, there is no clear mechanism of co-operation in the planning process; the possibilities 
for the participation of CSOs do not represent a sufficiently regulated and transparent selection 
mechanism. The organisations are left to organise themselves on their own.
All the other organisations and interest groups, we had to look for a way to involve them – 
for example, the regional and local associations, the professional organisations, the business 
associations, the environmental organizations. /…/ And it turned out that the state does not have 
a mechanism that would allow us to find such organisations and make a selection. (Council of 
Ministers, Bulgaria)
All the representatives of the state administration were there. It is another question how the 
communication  with  the  economic  and  social  partners  happened  /.../  the  application  of  the 
principles was enforced top-down from the EU and was formalistic to a large extent. (Bulgarian 
Association of Regional Development Agencies)
Furthermore, according to Balkan Assist’s study (Mihailov, 2005), at the central level the government 
still seems to communicate mainly with the so-called social partners (trade unions and employers, the 
Economic and Social Council), which the majority of civil society organisations consider to be part of 
the tripartite status-quo (BCNL, 2009). The elusive concept of representativeness is the main criteria 
applied when consultations are organised. The same approach was implemented when the partners in 
programming were identified. The Economic and Social Council was designed following the template 
of the European Social Committee, and to a large extent it transferred a rather tripartite model of 
consultations (Economic and Social Council Act, 2001), which is vastly seen as quasi-civic.
You cannot avoid presuming, especially when you look at the various implementation documents, 
that when organising the various working groups and discussions, it is easier to invite the usual 
suspects, i.e. the tripartite – the social partners. From there on /.../ (National Association of the 
municipalities in Bulgaria, Sofia)
The willingness to work with CSOs in the planning and programming process varies in the different 
government structures. This illustrates the lack of a uniform mechanism whereby this could happen 
and also places CSOs in a position of dependency on the ‘good will’ of certain administrative structures 
to apply the partnership principle. Thus, CSOs have to exert additional pressure to be included. Even 
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planning of regional and local development and the programming of structural funds remains weak. 
A great deal of criticism is aimed at the more general dialogue between the authorities and the non-
governmental sector, mostly with regard to the inclusion mechanism (selection of representatives), 
the efficacy of procedures, the impact on decision making and the process transparency. The main 
deficiencies lie in the interactions between the administration and the social and economic partners; 
namely, the lack of clear selection procedures, the privileged access of certain organisations, and the 
restrictive approach to partner selection. All this affects the work in the relevant working groups 
and the engagement of civil society organisations in the process. This resulted in contradictions in 
including CSOs other than the social partners.
CSOs took part largely on a voluntary basis. If we take the nationally represented organisations 
that have been defined by law, they are automatically in. The other group, i.e. the CSOs, is more 
difficult (to define – added by the author). /…/As there is no legislative procedure, we developed our 
own. The door was always open /…/ (Ministry of Social Policy and Employment)
The mechanism (of selecting CSOs in the working groups during programming) is different for the 
different Operational Programme (OP). The individual Operational Programme teams define the 
potential beneficiaries, choose who represents them and invite them to the Monitoring Committee. 
If an organisation sees it was omitted from the process and considers itself representative, it can 
take initiative to be included. Each OP has its own arrangement on how to invite the partners to 
take part in programming and the Monitoring Committee. (Ministry of Finance, National Fund)
Data from the Civil Society Index for Bulgaria 2008-2010 shows a low level of inclusion of civil society 
organisations9 (Hristova-Kurzydlowski, 2011) in various forms of participation within the Structural 
Funds planning and management. The matter is further complicated, as the CSOs in Bulgaria are still 
struggling with building organisational and financial capacity and securing themselves as partners in 
decision and policy making (Hristova-Kurzydlowski, 2011, p.57; Kabakchieva & Hristova-Kurzydlowski, 
2012). Though some legislation that allows CSOs participation in decision and policy making is in place 
and overall standards for consultations are adopted, it seems not to be enough to streamline routine 
public consultations subject to uniform rules (BCNL, 2009; Dimitrov, 2012). Furthermore, the lack of an 
overall binding framework to guide and facilitate the CSO-government relations leaves an amorphous 
area  of  partnership,  making  it  subject  to  arbitrariness  (BCNL,  2009;  Hristova-Kurzydlowski,  2011; 
Dimitrov, 2012; Kabakchieva & Hristova-Kurzydlowski, 2012). This is conducive to the problematic 
application of the principle of partnership.
Challenges and opportunities
The process of programming the EU funds calls for serious domestic transformation in member states, 
especially in countries with post-communist institutional pathways. It requires serious administrative 
and strategic planning capacity and experience habitualised as public policy making. The analysis 
above identifies some of the deficiencies that shape the main challenges in programming and the 
application of the principle of partnership in Bulgaria. 
The EU formal rules in establishing a complex management system, administrative capacity and 
interactions between a wide circle of actors based on the principles of partnership, co-ordination, 
decentralisation and complementarity, have been filtered through domestic factors. 
9    This study covers also the most active civil society organisations, which means that even they are excluded from 
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On the other hand, however, through implementation of the principle of partnership (though 
not directly) the CSOs managed to trigger a debate on partnership in policy making and advocacy 
initiatives for an encouraging environment for further involvement of CSOs in decision making. 
In general, the CSOs use the principle of partnership as a lever to open the national government 
to dialogue and consultation, especially when such mechanisms are non-existent prior to the EU. 
This energy has been capitalised in the attempts to influence the programming of the upcoming 
2014-2020 period, where some changes have already been observed in the inclusion of the CSOs and 
the elaboration of a Strategy for the NGOs in Bulgaria. However, the issues of routine predictable 
civil dialogue, ensuring balanced participation with relevant information, follow-up and feedback 
still remain, making the policy making and CSO involvement an ad hoc occurrence rather than a 
habitual process of partnership. This brings up the question of institutional change and the nature of 
institutions in Bulgaria. Being still unaccountable and reproducing inconsistency and unpredictability 
in policy making generates arbitrariness and overall lack of responsibility. This is further magnified 
by the lack of a universal legal framework of consultation that leaves the other stakeholders excluded 
and further centralises the over-centralised approach to policy making in the country.
Conclusion
The aim of the article was to identify the internal challenges in Bulgaria that affect the implementation 
of the principle of partnership in programming the EU funds. The article builds upon the already 
increasing  academic  evidence  on  the  limitations  of  the  principle  of  partnership,  especially  in 
its  transformative  potential,  thus,  adding  the  dimension  of  another  member  state.  It  has  been 
demonstrated that the application of the principle of partnership demands national adaptations 
and the transformation of rules, procedures and modes of governance that confront the informal 
constraints of the post-communist establishment.
The efficiency of the principle of partnership depends on the existence of clear-cut transparent 
mechanisms for coordination and implementation. This article illustrated critical junctures in the 
domestic adaptations of this principle. The entry of the main stakeholders was somewhat obstructed; 
the enforcement of certain rules was subjected to the ‘good will’ of the administration; the policy-
making process has proven chaotic, disorganised and highly centralised, dependent on the executive 
government; there are significant capacity gaps among all stakeholders; the selection procedures 
were highly controversial and subject to criticism; the programming was lacking coordination and 
the documents resulted in patchwork without subordination, harmonisation and agreement. The 
identified challenges highlight the lack of a routinised, predictable policy-making process, which has 
led to limited domestic adaptation and transformation.
Deficiencies in the application of the principle of partnership in the programming of the EU funds 
in Bulgaria are indicative of the gaps in public policy making in the country (Karamfilova, 2010). In 
the short-term, the transformation as a result of Europeanisation resulted only in isolated change 
(Lessenski, 2012). The EU conditionality after accession seems to be even less transformative and more 
conditioned by the domestic factors. It remains to be seen whether it is due to the inefficiency of the 
design of the principle of partnership or because of the partially reformed post-communist society.
There is an increased number of positive examples of cooperation and involvement of non-state 
actors, which allows optimism for future development and for the involvement of the CSOs in the 
upcoming  programming  period  in  Bulgaria.  However,  further  efforts  in  building  capacities  and 
structuring CSO-government relations are essential, as is the empowerment of sub-national bodies 
towards decentralisation, to ensure ownership of national policy making, and better management of 
EU funds to improve their positive impact on socio-economic development.Programming EU funds in Bulgaria: Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of Civil Society 37
References 
Bache, I. (2000). Europeanization and Partnership: Exploring and Explaining Variations in Policy Transfer. 
Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, 8, 1-24.
Bache, I., George, S. & Bulmer, S. (2011). Politics in the European Union. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Batory, A. & Cartwright, A. (2011). Re-visiting the Partnership Principle in Cohesion Policy: The Role of Civil 
Society: Organisations in Structural Funds Monitoring, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(4), 697-922.
Bauer, M. (2002). The EU ‘Partnership Principle’ Revisited - A Critical Appraisal of its Integrationist Potential as 
a Governance Device Interconnecting Multiple Administrative Arenas. Public Administration 80, 769-789.
Bechev, D. (2010). Bulgaria’s Path to EU Membership – and Beyond. In S. Katsikas (Ed.), Bulgaria and Europe: 
Shifting Identities (pp. 113-129). London, UK: Anthem Press.
Börzel, T.A. & Risse, T. (2003). Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In K. Featherstone & C. 
Radaelli (Eds.), Politics of Europeanization (pp. 57-80). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bulgarian Center for Non-Profit Law. (2009). Participation of NGOs in the Process of Policy- and Law – making. 
Sofia, Bulgaria: Author.
Bruszt, L. (2008). Multi-level Governance - the Eastern Versions: Emerging Patterns of Regional Development 
Governance in the New Member States. Regional and Federal Studies, 18, 607-627.
Council of the European Communities. (1988). Council Regulation No 2052/88 on the tasks of the Structural 
Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with 
the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments. Official 
Journal  of  the  European  Communities.  Retrieved  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:31988R2052:EN:HTML
Council of the European Communities. (1993). Council Regulation No 2081 (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 2052/88 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their 
activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other 
existing financial instruments. Official Journal of the European Communities. Retrieved from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:1993:193:SOM:EN:HTML
Council of the European Communities. (1999). Council Regulation No 1260/1999 (EC) laying down general 
provisions on the Structural Funds. Official Journal of the European Communities. Retrieved from: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:161:0001:0001:EN:PDF
Council of the European Communities. (2006). Council Regulation No 1083/2006 (EC) laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion 
Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. Official Journal of the European Communities. Retrieved 
from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006R1083:en:NOT
Council of Ministers of Republic of Bulgaria (2006). National Strategic Reference Framework for Bulgaria 2007-
2013. Retrieved from http://www.eufunds.bg/en/page/66
Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. & Risse, T. (2001). Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Center for the Study for Democracy. (2009). Crime without Punishment. Sofia, Bulgaria: Author. 
Center for the Study of Democracy. (2010). Civil society in Bulgaria: Trends and Risks. Sofia, Bulgaria: Author.
Dimitrov, G. (Ed.). (2004). Darzhavata sreshtu reformite. [The State against the Reforms]. Sofia, Bulgaria: IZTOK-
ZAPAD. 
Dimitrov, G., Danchev, V. & Karamfilova, E. (2008). The Social Challenges of European Integration for the 
countries of Southeastern Europe. In M. Stoicheva (Ed.), Balkans: Curbing Challenges. Effectiveness, Anti-
Corruption, and Citizen’s Participation (pp.27-62). Sofia, Bulgaria: Sofia University Press.38 Desislava Hristova Kurzydlowski
Dimitrov, G. (Ed.). (2012). Sagrazhdane na grazhdanstvoto: perspektivi za publichno partnyorstvo v Bulgaria. [Build-
ing the citizenry: Perspectives for the Public Partnership in Bulgaria]. Sofia, Bulgaria: Sofia University Press.
Economic and Social Council Act, Bulgaria (2001). Retrieved from http://www.esc.bg/en/about-esc/esc-law
European Citizen Action Service. (2005). Partnership: Principle and Practice. Brussels, Belgium: Author.
European Citizen Action Service. (2010). Working Paper on the Application of the Partnership Principle in EU 
Cohesion Policy. Brussels, Belgium: Author.
European  Commission.  (2001).  European  Governance:  A  White  Paper.  COM  (2001)  428.  Brussels:  Author. 
Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf
European  Commission.  (2003).  EU  Enlargement  and  Multi  Level  Governance  in  European  Regional  and 
Environment Policies: Patterns of Institutional Learning, Adaptation and Europeanization among Cohesion 
Countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and Lessons for New Members (Hungary and Poland). Retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/finalreport/hpse-ct-2001-00097-final-report.pdf
European Social Fund Committee. (2007). Social Partners as Beneficiaries, European Social Fund Support to Social 
Partners in the 2007-2013 period. Retrieved from: http://resourcecentre.etuc.org/linked_files/documents/
Social%20Partners%20as%20beneficiaries%20ESF%20support%20to%20social%20partners%20in%20
the%202007-3013%20period%20EN.pdf
Featherstone K., & Radaelli, C. (Eds.). (2003). Politics of Europeanization. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Getimis, P. & Grigoriadou, D. (2004). The Europeanization of Urban Governance in Greece: A Dynamic and 
Contradictory Process. International Planning Studies, 9, 5-25.
Harvey, B. (2004). The Illusion of inclusion: Access by CSOs to the Structural Funds in the New Member States of 
Eastern and Central Europe. Brussels: Report for the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS).
Hristova, D. (2010). Institutsionalni defekti pred realizatsiyata na programa FAR za razvitie na grazhdanskoto 
obshtestvo. [Institutional Deficiencies in the Implementation of the PHARE Preaccession Programme 
for Civil Society Development in Bulgaria.]. In Predizvikatelstva pred Bulgaria sled prisaedinyavaneto i kam 
Evropeiskiya sayuz [Challenges in Bulgaria After the Accession to the EU] (pp. 92- 122). Sofia, Bulgaria: St. 
Kliment Ohridski University Press.
Hristova-Kurzydlowski, D. (2011). Citizen Action without Engagement. Civil Society Index for Bulgaria 2008-2010. 
Sofia, Bulgaria: Open Society Institute – Sofia. 
Hughes, J., Sasse, G., & Gordon, C. (2004). Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kabakchieva, P. (2007). Dvulikiyat Janus: Evropeiski pravila v postkomunisticheska sreda. Sluchayat SAPARD 
[The Two-faced Janus: European Rules in Post-Communist Environment: The SAPARD Case]. Sociologicheski 
problem, 3(4), 121-149.
Kabakchieva, P. & Hristova-Kurzydlowski, D. (2012). Civil Society in Bulgaria: NGOs versus Spontaneous Civic 
Activism. Sofia, Bulgaria: Open Society Institute – Sofia.
Karamfilova, E. (2010). Ministerstvo na zemedelieto i hranite – institucionalen avtoportret. [The Bulgarian 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Food  –  Institutional  Selfportrait.]  v  Predizvikatelstva  pred  Bulgaria  sled 
prisaedinyavaneto i kam Evropeiskiya sayuz [Challenges in Bulgaria After the Accession to the EU] (pp. 122-
165). Sofia, Bulgaria: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press.
Kelleher, J., Batterbury, S. & Stern, E. (1999). The Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership Principle: Final Synthesis 
Report. London, UK: Tavistock Institute.
Lessenski, M. (2012). State of the Union: A Big Bang Theory of Europe, Findings of the Catch-Up Index. Sofia, 
Bulgaria: Open Society Institute – Sofia.
Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: The John 
Hopkins University Press.
Marinov, V., Garnizov, V. & Georgiev, G. (2006). Assessment of the Capacity of Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Business to participate in the Absorption of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. Sofia, Bulgaria: UNDP.Programming EU funds in Bulgaria: Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of Civil Society 39
Marinov, V. & Malhasian, D. (2006). Partnerships in Structural and Cohesion Funds Planning and Absorption: A 
Comparative Review of the Practices of Selected EU Member States and Lessons Learned for Bulgaria. Sofia, 
Bulgaria: UNDP.
Mihailov, D. (Team leader). (2005). Civil Society without the Citizens. An Assessment of Bulgarian Civil Society. 
Civil Society Index 2003-2005 Sofia, Bulgaria: Balkan Assist Association. 
Milio, S. (2007). Can Administrative Capacity Explain Differences in Regional Performances? Evidence from 
Structural Funds Implementation in Southern Italy. Regional Studies, 41, 429-442.
Ministry  of  Finance  of  Republic  of  Bulgaria  (2004).  Socialno-ikonomichesko  partnyorstvo  v  Bulgaria  kam 
Natsionalen Plan za razvitie. [The Socio-Economic Partnership in Bulgaria: Methodological Guidance to the 
National Development Plan]. Retrieved from http://www.eufunds.bg/bg/page/23
Nanetti, R., Rato, H., & Rodrigues, M. (2004). Institutional Capacity and Reluctant Decentralisation in 
Portugal: The Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region. Regional and Federal Studies, 14, 405-429.
Nikolova, P. (2007, May). Europeanisation as a contest: The EU and sub-national governance in Bulgaria. A paper 
prepared for the 10th Biannual Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, Canada.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Offe, C. (1996). Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Open Society Institute – Sofia. (2011). Challenges to the new programming of EU funds in Bulgaria after 2013 
based on the analysis of the experience in 2007 – 2013. Sofia, Bulgaria: Author.
Powell, W. & DiMaggio, P. (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
CEE Bankwatch. (2005). Public Eye on the EU Funds. Civil society Involvement in the Structural, Cohesion and 
Rural Development Funds, Examples from Central and Eastern Europe. Brussels, Belgium: Author.
Radaelli, C. (2000). Wither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change. European Integration 
online Papers (EIoP), 4(8). Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm
SF Team for Sustainable Future. (2010). Structural funds and partneship. Budapest, Hungary: Author. Retrieved 
from http://www.sfteam.eu/index.php?id=53
SF Team for Sustainable Future. (2011a). Why Bother with Partnership. Budapest, Hungary: Author. Retrieved 
from: http://www.sfteam.eu/index.php?id=62
SF Team for Sustainable Future. (2011b). Enhancing Transparency, the Partnership Principle and Public Participation 
in the Future Cohesion Policy. Budapest, Hungary: Author. Retrieved from http://www.sfteam.eu/index.
php?id=65
Stark, D. & Bruszt, L. (1998). Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe. 
Cambridge; UK: Cambridge University Press.
Transparency International Bulgaria (2008-2012). Corruption Perception Indexes. Retrieved from: http://www.
transparency.bg/en/researches/corruption-perception-index/
Yanakiev, A. (2010). The Europeanization of Bulgarian regional policy: a case of strengthened centralization. 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10, 45-57.
Desislava Hristova Kurzydlowski is finishing her PhD at the University of Sofia St. Kliment Ohridski, 
European  Studies  Department.  She  is  interested  in  civil  society  development,  public  policies,  EU 
Cohesion policy, EU enlargement and pre-accession instruments, and forms and initiatives aimed at 
citizen participation, transparency, and public accountability.40 Desislava Hristova Kurzydlowski
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank the Open Society Institute – Sofia for help with the empirical data. 
Special thanks goes to Associate Professor Petya Kabakchieva for her invaluable insights on my work; 
and to Dr. Marcin Dabrowski for his constructive suggestions and comments. Furthermore she would 
like to extend her thanks to the reviewers and the Managing Editor of the Studies of Transition States 
and Societies for their time, suggestions and useful inputs. This article is based on a working paper in 
Assessing Accession network.Programming EU funds in Bulgaria: Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of Civil Society 41
Appendix 1: Profile of respondents in semi-structured interviews conducted May-July 2010/2012-2013
1.  Ministry of Finance, National Fund, Expert
2.  Former Deputy Minister of Finance
3.  Former Deputy Minister of Public Administration and Administrative Reform
4.  Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Deputy Minister 
5.  Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Expert 
6.  Council of Ministers, Secretariat of the Minister for EU Funds, former representatives of the Agency 
for Economic Analysis and Forecasts – 2 Experts
7.  Former representative of the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasts, now part of an environ-
mental CSO 
8.  Directorate National Development Plan
9.  National Association of the municipalities in Bulgaria
10. Foundation for Local Government Reform 
11.  Bulgarian Association of Regional Development Agencies
12. Platform of community centres 
13. Coalition for sustainable use of the EU funds
14. Za Zemiata NGO
15. Balkan Assist Association